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PROSECUTING ATROCITY
CRIMES IN NATIONAL COURTS:
LOOKING BACK ON 2009 IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
David Schwendiman* †
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

This article grew out of the Atrocity Crimes Litigation Yearin-Review (2009) Conference convened by the Center for
International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of
Law on February 4, 2010. The objective of the Conference was to
analyze whether and how various tribunals and courts dealing with
atrocity crimes advanced international criminal and humanitarian
law during 2009. What follows is a look back on a significant year
*

The author is an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Utah. He
served as an international prosecutor in the Special Department for War Crimes of
the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 2006 to December
2009. From November 2007 to December 2009, he was Deputy Chief Prosecutor
and Head of the Special Department for War Crimes. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author, for which he alone is responsible. They do not
reflect nor represent the views of the United States Department of Justice, the
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, or the Prosecutor’s Office
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
†
I am grateful to my national colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina for accepting
me and giving me the opportunity to lead them for a time as the Head of the
Special Department for War Crimes. A more committed, professional, and
courageous group of prosecutors would be hard to find anywhere in any
prosecution service. They are not often well served by their national government
and the institutions in which they work, but they persist and they get the job done
in spite of it all. I admire and respect them. My comments are meant especially for
the prosecutors in the Special Department for War Crimes and the judges in the
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prosecutors and judges in the Cantons and
Districts who have already caught the vision of what needs to be done to make a
meaningful difference in dealing with the nation’s war crimes predicament. My
hope is that they will take what I write seriously, use it, adapt it, or reject it in
favor of something better, but not simply ignore it.
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in the life of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(State Prosecutor’s Office) and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(State Court).
National investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes
are becoming increasingly important because of the imminent
closure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR)1 and the inherent limitations of the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction.2 As a result, war crimes
prosecutions in national courts, including Bosnia and Herzegovina,
will have a greater impact on the development of international
criminal and humanitarian law than ever before. However, the risks
to the development of the law will also be greater. For these reasons,
it is appropriate to examine some of the more significant
developments in atrocity crime litigation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
over the last few years. These developments include responses to
important issues that directly relate to the enforcement of
international criminal and humanitarian law in a national jurisdiction
and that have potential for affecting the overall development of
international criminal and humanitarian law.
In 2007, the State Prosecutor’s Office, specifically the
Special Department for War Crimes (Special Department), which
manages the investigation and prosecution of war crimes at the
national level, and the State Court began making necessary and
significant advances in war crimes case selection and prioritization,
charging, plea-bargaining, and in managing the forensic aspects of
locating, recovering, examining, and identifying mortal remains
from the war. Unfortunately, developments in the Prosecutor’s
Office since the end of 2009 are jeopardizing past advances in the
investigation and prosecution of war crimes cases. This is the result
of the failure in 2009 of the national government, the international
community, and certain international organizations to take
responsibility to develop international criminal and humanitarian
law and the institutions that apply that law in Bosnia and
Herzegovina more seriously. The national government in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not genuinely committed to supporting the work of
the State Court or the State Prosecutor’s Office. Without consistent
1

See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
2
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, Jul. 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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international encouragement and support and, more importantly,
without consistent political and financial support from the national
government, the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office have
little chance of surviving, let alone succeeding. The advances in
atrocity crime jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have
occurred since 2007 are in jeopardy of being lost. If they are lost,
atrocity crime jurisprudence and practice elsewhere will be affected.
While a number of verdicts and opinions rendered in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in war crimes cases over the past four years have
made important contributions to the development of the country’s
war crimes jurisprudence,3 this article is mostly a review of policy
and structural developments in the Prosecutor’s Office’s Special
Department for War Crimes since 2008. The main advances
included installing policies to better utilize the resources available
for investigating and prosecuting war crimes and ensuring that the
3

From 2005 through March 2010, Section I of the State Court, which has
jurisdiction over war crimes cases, reported sixty-three First Instance verdicts and
thirty-eight Second Instance verdicts. A number of First Instance verdicts and
appellate rulings in 2008 and 2009 made important contributions to the
development of the war crimes jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the
case of Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnai and Herzegovina v. Miloš Stupar, et al.,
Case No. X-KR-05/24, (Jul. 29, 2008), a trial panel returned a First Instance
verdict in 2008 convicting six of the original eleven men charged with genocide in
connection with the murder of over 1,000 Bosniak (Muslim) men in the
warehouse of the Kravica Farming Cooperative in July 1995. This was the first
national genocide verdict rendered by the State Court. Miloš Stupar was
subsequently acquitted by a dubious appellate court ruling in 2009, but the
sentences and convictions of the remaining parties in the case were upheld on
appeal. In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Milorad Trbić, Case
No. X-KR-07/386, (Oct. 16, 2009), another case where the accused was found
guilty of genocide, the State Court made important findings in 2009 regarding the
application of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and the crime of genocide.
In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Marko Radić et. al., Case
No. X-KR-05/139, (May 14, 2008), a crimes against humanity case, the State
Court made important findings in 2009 regarding command responsibility and
joint criminal enterprise forms of liability. In Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Paško Ljubičić, Case No. X-KR-06/241, (Apr. 29, 2008),
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herezegovina v. Dušan Fuštar, Case No. XKR-06/200-1 (Apr. 21, 2008), and Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Damir Ivanković, Case No. X-KR-08/549-1 (Jul. 2, 2009), the State Court
accepted pleas of guilty entered by the accused in exchange for the prosecutor’s
recommendations regarding sentences. The Ljubičić and Ivanković pleas were
partially predicated on their promise to assist in pending and future investigations.
Both provided important assistance in pending matters, including help locating
and recovering mortal remains.
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human rights standards developed by the Special Department for
War Crimes guided its work. These important developments are
now in jeopardy and deserve the immediate attention of the
international community and the national government to preserve
them.
II. BACKGROUND
¶5

¶6

¶7

The 1992 to 1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
“Bosnian War”) occurred as a consequence and part of the breakup
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which began in the
late 1980s. In January 1991, Slovenia successfully split from
Yugoslavia following a referendum on independence and a near
bloodless ten-day war. Next, Croatia separated from Yugoslavia and
fought a “war of independence,” that lasted from January 1992 to
November 1995. In October 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared
its sovereignty.
Following the October declaration, tensions rose between the
Muslim, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Serb constituent peoples in the
newly formed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1992, Bosnian-Serb
forces besieged Sarajevo and hostilities began throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina.4 The fighting officially ended on November 21,
1995, after the parties to the conflict met in Dayton, Ohio and
agreed to the terms of the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords).5 As a result of the
fighting, 2.2 million people were displaced and an estimated 97,214
people, including 39,685 civilians, were killed.6
Among other things, the Dayton Accords, which were
concluded in Paris in December 1995, placed Bosnia and
4

See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (Penguin
Books 1995) (1996); SABRINA P. RAMET, THE THREE YUGOSLAVIAS: STATEBUILDING AND LEGITIMATION, 1918-2005 341- 469 (Woodrow Wilson Center
Press 2006).
5
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
(Dayton Peace Agreement), Nov. 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170 [hereinafter Dayton
Accords]; see also, RICHARD HOLBROKE, TO END A WAR, (Modern Library rev.
ed. 1999).
6
See Research and Documentation Centre, Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment
of the Database, (June 17, 2007) (finding that of the 39,685 civilians who were
killed by hostile action during the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 33,071 or
approximately 83% were Bosniaks (Muslims), 4,075 or 10% were Serbs, 2,163 or
6% were Croats, and 376 or approximately 1% were of other backgrounds).
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Herzegovina under international oversight in the form of a High
Representative who was given extraordinary powers to ensure that
the Dayton Accords were fully implemented.7 A Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) made up of representatives of the
international community was formed to advise the High
Representative. The goal of the Dayton Accords and international
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to develop and strengthen
government institutions, including the courts and prosecutors, and
promote economic development so that full ownership and
responsibility for governance can be given over to national and local
authorities. This goal has not yet been met.
In many ways, although the Dayton Accords stopped the
shooting, the war never truly ended. The conflict continues to affect
and influence political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and remains
just beneath the surface of public consciousness. It emerges in how
states in the region use war crime allegations for political advantage
and in how atrocity crimes are dealt with in the national criminal
justice systems. Each state in the Balkans has addressed war crimes
stemming from the 1992-1995 conflict with varying degrees of
success and credibility. Of the states in the region, Bosnia and
Herzegovina is saddled with the greatest challenges and war crimes
workload simply because the war was fought mostly within its
borders and, as a result, it suffered the most human losses and the
greatest property damage.
In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve long-term
political stability and economic development, it must properly deal
with atrocity crimes committed during the Bosnian War. As an
incentive to make this happen, the PIC required that national
authorities entrench the rule of law in part through the adoption of a
7

See Peace Implementation Council Bonn Conclusions, art. XI. ¶ 2b (Dec. 10,
1997), available at: http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 (The
High Representative is designated to oversee implementation of the civilian
aspects of the Dayton Accords. The High Representative was given extraordinary
powers (“Bonn Powers”) in December 1997 at the Peace Implementation Council
Conference in Bonn, including the power to “use his final authority in theatre
regarding interpretation of the Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the
Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making
binding decisions, as he judges necessary,” on, among other things, “interim
measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will
remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a
decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned.” Bonn
Conclusions, XI. High Representative, ¶ 11).
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national war crimes strategy.8 This requirement was partially met, at
least on paper, when the Council of Ministers adopted the National
War Crimes Strategy in December 2008.9 While the National War
Crimes Strategy was viewed as a political accomplishment,
practically speaking it is weak and will do little that is meaningful to
address Bosnia and Herzegovina’s war crimes predicament either in
the short or the long term. This is because it relies on a number of
baseless assumptions: that the number of war crimes “cases” is
known or determinable with precision; that the number of hardcopy
war crimes related files held by the prosecutors throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina is a reliable measure for predicting either the
workload or required resources; or, finally, that the “most complex
and top priority” cases can all be resolved in seven years and the rest
in fifteen years. The War Crimes Strategy also makes a fundamental
strategic mistake by requiring Cantonal (Bosnian-Croat Federation)
and District (Republika Srpska) prosecutors and courts, despite their
express concerns and reasonable reservations,10 to manage the bulk
of the war crimes workload. Responsibility for war crimes
8

See Peace Implementation Council, Declaration by the Steering Board of the
Peace Implementation Council, 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2008) (stating that prior to
transition, Bosnia and Herzegovina must entrench the rule of law as demonstrated
through the adoption of a national war crimes strategy, passage of a law on aliens
and asylum, and the adoption of a national justice sector reform strategy).
9
The author of this article was a member of the Working Group that had the task
of creating the National War Crimes Strategy. Aside from the Chief Prosecutor,
who served as Chair of the Working Group, the author was the only working war
crimes prosecutor on the Working Group. During deliberations on the draft War
Crimes Strategy document, the author expressed disagreement with the way in
which the process was being managed and how it was being influenced by
individuals who were seemingly interested only in satisfying the PIC requirement
and not writing a strategy with long-term value. The author gave the Chair written
objections to the substance of the proposed War Crimes Strategy when it became
apparent that the proposed strategy was incomplete and unworkable in practice. In
the end, the author abstained from voting on the final strategy. It is the author’s
view that the December 2008 National War Crimes Strategy fails in significant
ways to meet the spirit of the Rule of Law objective set out by the PIC. Its value
came mostly in forcing the national government and the international community
to seriously consider the future of war crimes investigations and prosecutions in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and begin to plan concretely to deal with that future. In
the end it simply fell short.
10
See Richard S. Gebelein, Solving War Crimes Cases in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Report on the Capacities of Courts and Prosecutor Offices’ within
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Investigate, Prosecute and Try War Crimes Cases
(2008).
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investigations and prosecutions should have been centralized at the
national level in the State Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court
instead of diluting scarce resources by trying to create the capacity
to investigate and prosecute war crimes in every Canton and
District. This singular weakness will make the implementation of
the National War Crimes Strategy problematic for years.
In addition to the requirement imposed by the PIC, Bosnia
and Herzegovina has no choice but to properly address war crimes,
as onerous as its obligation may be, because there are many people
who are still deeply affected by what happened to them emotionally,
physically, economically, religiously, socially, and politically. The
national government has shown little will to meaningfully deal with
the consequences of war crimes, but victims’ demand for
government action will not subside. The failure to deal with this
effectively frustrates survivors’ commitment to the state and is one
of the reasons why so many leave the country when they can or have
plans to leave in the event of renewed hostilities.11
If war crimes are not addressed in a meaningful way,
political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue and
tension will persist between the sides that still battle one another
socially and politically. Until a sufficient level of accountability has
been reached to satisfy its legal obligations, Bosnia and Herzegovina
must continue to investigate, prosecute, and punish those
responsible for atrocity during the conflict, provide the victims and
survivors with meaningful redress, and establish enough of a reliable
record, arrived at through a process that is legitimate and credible, to
prevent the history of the conflict from being manipulated and
exploited for political advantage by any side. If it fails to do this,
atrocities committed during the war will continue to frustrate the
nation’s ability to provide its citizens better lives and more
opportunity.
III. THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

¶12

The period between the end of the fighting in 1995 and the
beginning of justice sector reform in 2000 saw relatively few war
crimes prosecuted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was principally
because the ICTY Rules of the Road process throttled local

11

See United Nations Development Programme: Bosnia Herzegovina, The Silent
Majority Speaks (2007).
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prosecutions. With the creation of the State Court in 200012 by thenHigh Representative Wolfgang Petritsch and the State Prosecutor’s
Office in 200213 by then-High Representative Paddy Ashdown, a
state level infrastructure began to develop that promised to be able
to eventually support national prosecution of war crimes cases in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The State Court and the State Prosecutor’s
Office are national institutions with statewide jurisdiction over war
crimes14 committed during the Bosnian War.15 The State Prosecutor
is independent of the State Court.16 The State Court and State
Prosecutor’s Office share jurisdiction in war crimes cases with the
Cantonal and District courts and prosecutors, a confusing situation
that was further complicated by the National War Crimes Strategy.
In 2003, following the creation of the State Court and State
Prosecutor’s Office, High Representative Ashdown proposed a
number of criminal justice reforms that were adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly. One change was the rewriting of Chapter
17 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina to include war
crimes provisions that were consistent with the ICTY Statute and,
for the most part, were modeled on the ICC (Rome) Statute. These
provisions were necessary before the ICTY could begin under Rule
11bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to return
indicted cases that it could not complete to Bosnia and Herzegovina
for trial. Without such substantive changes to the criminal code,
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to prosecute war crimes according
to existing and developing international criminal and humanitarian
law was questionable. The reforms also implemented a commonlaw-like, adversarial system of criminal justice.

12

Office of the High Representative, Decision Establishing the BiH State Court
(Nov. 12, 2000).
13
Office of the High Representative, Decision Enacting the Law on the
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Aug. 6, 2002).
14
War crimes, as the phrase is used in this article, includes genocide, crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of
the law of armed conflict. The State Prosecutor and the State Court have
jurisdiction over war crimes. See CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., ch. 17 (2003).
15
The State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office also have certain general
crime responsibilities related to tax, customs, and terrorism cases and specific
responsibility for organized crime, economic crime, and corruption cases. See
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,Official Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, No. 16/02, art. 13 (2004). See also id. art. 12.
16
Id. art. 2.
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Under new Criminal Procedure Code provisions, also
adopted in 2003, only the prosecutor in Bosnia and Herzegovina can
initiate and conduct criminal proceedings, a term that includes
criminal investigations.17 An investigation begins when the
prosecutor issues an investigative order after finding “grounds for
suspicion” that a crime has been committed.18 On the national level,
once the State Prosecutor is satisfied that there is “enough evidence
for grounded suspicion” that crimes over which the State Court has
jurisdiction was committed, he prepares and proposes an indictment
listing the person or persons accused to the Court for confirmation.19
Indictments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are complicated
matters of form and substance. Article 227 of the Criminal
Procedure Code describes in detail the requirements of an
indictment proposed for confirmation by the State Court. Every
indictment includes extensive lists of proposed witnesses and
evidence, a lengthy recitation of the factual allegations in support of
the charges, and a detailed summary of the results of the
investigation that led to the indictment. Indictments are much more
than mere notice pleadings like those commonly used in most
adversarial jurisdictions, including the ICTY.20 Since war crimes
practice began in earnest at the state level in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 2005, the State Court has been relatively strict about
holding prosecutors to the use of evidence and witnesses listed in the
indictment, and proof of the allegations made in support of the
counts charged in the indictment.
A preliminary hearing judge in the State Court will confirm
an indictment submitted by the prosecutor if, after examining each
count along with the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, he
17

CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 1, 16.
Id. arts. 17, 216, 35(2)(a), “[A]s soon as he becomes aware that there are
grounds for suspicion that a criminal offense has been committed, [the prosecutor
has the right and duty] to take necessary steps to discover it and investigate it, to
identify the suspect(s), to guide and supervise the investigation, as well as direct
the activities of authorized officials pertaining to the identification of suspect(s)
and the gathering of information and evidence.”
19
Id. art. 226.
20
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 47(c): “The indictment shall set
forth the name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the facts
of the case and of the crime with which the suspect is charged.” An indictment is
reviewed by the Trial Chamber to determine whether a prima facie case has been
established before it is confirmed; Statute of the International Tribunal of the
ICTY art. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
18

278

¶17

¶18

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vol. 8

determines that the Court has jurisdiction, concludes that the
indictment meets the formal requirements of Article 227, satisfies
himself that the statute of limitations has not run, amnesty has not
been granted the accused, or whether “some other obstacles preclude
prosecution,” and is convinced that “grounded suspicion” exists.21
These determinations are made on the information contained in the
indictment and in the accompanying documentation supplied by the
prosecutor. Although not entirely clear from the decisions of the
State Court, the standard used by the preliminary hearing judge
appears to be whether the submitted materials establish a prima facie
case.
In 2004, special divisions were created within the State
Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office to handle war crimes
cases.22 Section I of the State Court, also known as the War Crimes
Chamber, has jurisdiction over Chapter 17 war crimes that were
committed during the Bosnian War.23 First Instance trials in Section
I are conducted before a three judge panel. During proceedings, the
accused is presumed innocent24 and is entitled to present a defense.25
The prosecutor has the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Verdicts in First Instance trials can be
appealed to the Appellate Division of Section I, which conducts
Second Instance proceedings and issues final and binding verdicts.26
Some matters related to issues raised in war crimes cases can also be
taken to the Constitutional Court, which has prescribed jurisdiction
to render opinions on issues referred to it by any court concerning
whether a law, “on whose validity its decision depends,” is
compatible with the constitution, the European Convention on
Human Rights or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina.27
The Special Department for War Crimes (Special
Department) in the State Prosecutor’s Office was created in 2004 to
investigate and prosecute Chapter 17 war crimes that were
21

CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 228.
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 24; Law on
the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, arts. 3, 12.
23
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 13.
24
CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 3.
25
Id. art. 7.
26
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 26.
27
The Constitutional Court also has jurisdiction over disputes between the
political entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are referred to it by the executive
or the Parliamentary Assembly. See BOSN. & HERZ CON. art. VI; Dayton Accords,
supra note 5, Annex 5.
22
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committed during the war.28 Prosecutors in the Special Department
initiate war crimes investigations,29 authorize arrests,30 prepare and
propose indictments to the State Court for confirmation,31 and
present evidence in support of confirmed indictments in proceedings
before Section I.32 Special Department prosecutors also represent the
government in appeals before the Section I Appellate Division.33
Beginning in late 2004, international prosecutors were
permitted to practice in the Special Department for War Crimes.34
International prosecutors have the same responsibilities, authority,
and are subject to the same rules as national prosecutors. They
investigate and prosecute war crimes alongside their national
colleagues with full authority and privileges of audience in the State
Court.35 This unique situation allows international prosecutors to
have a direct hand in the enforcement, application, and interpretation
28

Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, arts. 3, 12.
CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 35, 216.
30
Id. arts. 123, 131-147.
31
Id. arts. 35, 226-228.
32
Id. arts. 35, 260, 261, 277.
33
Id. arts. 35, 293.
34
Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 18(1);
Agreement Between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Registry for Section I for War Crimes and Section
II for Organised Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and
Appellate Divisions of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Special
Department for War Crimes and the Special Department for Organized Crime,
Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as well as on the Creation of the Transition Council, Replacing the
Registry Agreement of 1 December 2004 and the Annex Thereto, Official Gazette
of Bosnia and Herzegovina-International Agreements 3/07, art. 8 (2007). See also,
Book of Rules on the Procedure for the Selection and Appointment of
International Judges and Prosecutors, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council,
Nov. 10, 2006. The Registrar for the Special Department for War Crimes, the
Prosecutor’s Office, and the High Representative agreed in 2005 that six
international prosecutors would work in the Special Department for War Crimes.
The 2006 revised Registry Agreement contemplated that the number of
international prosecutors would gradually decrease over a transitional period until
at the end of 2009 no international prosecutors would handle war crimes cases. It
became clear early in 2008, however, that the need for continued involvement of
international prosecutors in the Special Department would not end as early as
predicted by the Registry Agreement, but the international community was
reluctant and slow to instruct the Registry to seek the changes and make the
adjustments needed to keep international prosecutors involved beyond 2009.
35
See Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 15, art. 18(1).
29
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of international criminal and humanitarian law in war crimes cases
at the national level.
In addition to international prosecutors who were practicing
in Section I, in 2004 international judges began sitting on Section I
trial panels and appellate panels.36 The original intent of this
extraordinary arrangement was to allow international judges and
prosecutors to participate directly in war crimes trials and appeals
for a “transition” period of no more than five years, an arbitrary
deadline that ended on December 14, 2009. The High
Representative exercised his extraordinary powers in December
2009 and extended the mandate of a number of international
prosecutors for an additional three years.37 However, the High
Representative did not extend the mandate of Section I international
judges beyond what was required to complete cases in progress.38
The High Representative’s delay in extending international
prosecutor’s mandates until the eve of expiration resulted in the loss
of all but one experienced international prosecutor. Many
international staff members in the Special Department for War
Crimes found it necessary to leave as a consequence. This is a
serious setback for ongoing cases and future investigations and
prosecutions because it means the loss of experts on the use of
international criminal and humanitarian law in the national criminal
justice system. The true impact of the loss of international
prosecutors may never be known, but it will certainly be felt as cases
that were under investigation by international prosecutors begin to
stall and as the Special Department attempts to find temporary
replacements to cover cases in trial or to stretch already thin
resources to meet critical emergencies.
The government recently authorized new national
prosecutors for the Special Department and the High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council, an independent national body that selects and
oversees all prosecutors and judges working in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to chose three new international prosecutors who were
36

Id. art. 65.
See Office of the High Representative [OHR], Decision Enacting the Law on
Amendments to the Law on Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR
Doc. 19/09 (Dec. 14, 2009). The High Representative’s did not extend the mission
of international prosecutors working in the State Prosecutor’s Office’s Special
Department for Organized Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption.
38
See Office of the High Representative [OHR], Decision Enacting the Law on
Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR Doc. 18/09
(Dec. 14, 2009).
37
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to begin working in the Special Department for War Crimes in the
second quarter of 2010. Only two had accepted positions by the
beginning of July 2010. However, it will be some time before the
new national and international prosecutors are able to make up for
the loss of knowledge, skill, and experience that resulted from the
High Representative’s and the national government’s failure to
extend the international prosecutors’ mandates before December
2009. The poor handling of this issue by the national government,
the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and the High
Representative illustrates the precarious position in which the
development of international criminal and humanitarian law finds
itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Continued involvement of international prosecutors and
judges in war crimes investigations and prosecutions is necessary to
ensure that international criminal and humanitarian law is developed
and applied properly by national institutions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. If this does not occur, what the ICTY began fifteen
years ago will be in serious jeopardy of becoming a relic when the
ICTY closes, as is expected, in less than two years. It is too early to
know whether there is a reliable way to gauge when international
involvement should end, and the High Representative was unwise to
set another arbitrary deadline for ending international prosecutors’
participation in the work in the Special Department for War Crimes.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN 2009

¶24

To effectively discuss advances in international criminal and
humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2009, it is also
necessary to mention developments during 2008. As noted earlier,
this article is not a comprehensive review of developments, either in
policy or jurisprudence, in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2008 or
2009. Those with an interest in substantive international criminal
and humanitarian law as it has been developed and applied in Bosnia
and Herzegovina ought to review the verdicts and decisions of the
First Instance panels and the Appellate panels in Section I and
comment on how the State Court is influencing international
criminal and humanitarian law and on how the State Court’s
jurisprudence is developing.39 Decisions of the Constitutional Court
39

English translations of Section I decisions are available at www.sudbih.gov.ba.
English translations of confirmed indictments of parties in war crimes cases are
available at www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba and at www.sudbih.gov.ba. The future of
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should be examined for how they address war crimes related issues
and, more generally, for the process by which war crimes are dealt
with at all levels of the criminal justice system, particularly whether
war crimes investigations and prosecutions comply with the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights.40
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the principal stewards of
international criminal and humanitarian law and its role in
advancing international criminal and humanitarian law will become
even more important as the international ad hoc tribunals close. As a
member of the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina
shares an interest and responsibility with the rest of the world in
ensuring that it builds upon the atrocity crimes jurisprudence that
English translation programs in the State Court and State Prosecutor’s Office is
uncertain. If international financial support for the State Court or State
Prosecutor’s Office ends or is mismanaged and translation and interpretation
capacity is lost, it will become much harder for the international community to
evaluate whether and how Bosnia and Herzegovina is contributing to the
advancement of international criminal and humanitarian law. For this reason, the
international community has an interest in preserving the language assistants and
other translation and interpretation components now supporting the State
Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court.
40
See, e.g., Appeal of Abduladhim Maktouf, Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Ap. No. 1785/06 (2007). The decisions of the Constitutional Court
are available on its website: www.ccbh.ba. See also Husković, et al. v. The
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/02/12551, Decision on Admissibility
and Merits, (Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003), i.e., a
general discussion of the responsibilities of prosecuting authorities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights insofar as the investigation of matters related to people missing in the war
and the rights of their survivors are concerned; see also, The Advocacy Center
TRIAL (ACT), Enforced disappearance of Edin Mahmuljin in June 1992,
http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=1235&L=5 (July 22, 2010); The Advocacy
Center TRIAL (ACT), Enforced disappearance of Nedžad Fazlić in June 1992,
http://www.trial-ch.org/index.php?id=1236&L=5 (July 22, 2010). Both
submissions were filed in November 2009. Both cases were filed on behalf of
survivors of the two men and both assert that the two are victims of violations of
the procedural aspects of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5
(right to liberty and security) in conjunction with Article 1 (obligation to respect
human rights) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European
Convention on Human Rights “due to the ongoing failure of BiH authorities to
conduct an ex officio, prompt, impartial, independent and thorough investigation
on [their] arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in order to establish
[their] fate and whereabouts, as well as to identify those responsible for these
crimes and to prosecute, judge and sanction them.”
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has evolved in the international ad hoc tribunals, especially the
ICTY.
Compared to other countries in the region, the
accomplishments in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2006,
notwithstanding shortcomings, are remarkable and significant. As
mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered the greatest losses in
the 1992-1995 war and has the most work to do as a consequence.
At the same time, it is the least economically developed state in the
region, its resources are limited, and its political culture is not
inclined to mount a sustained effort to do all it must to meet human
rights standards and international expectations. Nonetheless, with
international assistance, the prosecutors, judges, and investigators
working on war crimes cases at the national level and in some of the
Cantons and Districts have achieved more than any other nation in
the region, both in numbers, quality, and credibility of cases
undertaken and resolved. Prosecutors’ and judges’ knowledge and
skill in applying international criminal and humanitarian law
continues to develop with experience.
The problems that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not,
for the most part, at the working level. The legitimacy of what most
prosecutors and judges are doing at the national level is
unquestioned for now. The future, however, is uncertain. If the State
Court, the Special Department for War Crimes, and the State
Prosecutor’s Office are managed properly, if they receive the
support they need from the national government, and if they get
proper support and encouragement, war crimes prosecutions in
Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to meet international
standards for fairness, achieve respectable outcomes, and be the
benchmark for war crimes prosecutions in the region.
The State Prosecutor and the State Court have the
opportunity to influence the development of international criminal
and humanitarian law in a positive way and to demonstrate its
increasing worth in international and domestic affairs. The national
prosecutors and judges working on war crimes cases are maturing
with the task. However, they will continue to need encouragement
and assistance from the international community through the direct
involvement of international prosecutors and judges and from
scholarly interest in the international criminal and humanitarian law
jurisprudence developing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
opportunity is too valuable to let slip by and too important for the
international community to withdraw from too soon.
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A. Human Rights Based Prosecution Standards
¶29

¶30

One of the most significant developments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 2009 was the formal integration of human rights
based standards into the mission of the Special Department for War
Crimes and the policies implemented to help the Special Department
achieve its mission.
Article II of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
makes the ECHR an integral part of domestic law.41 The standards
set by the ECHR apply to war crimes work at the national, Cantonal,
and District levels. Under the ECHR’s Article 2 right to life
provisions, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), Bosnia and Herzegovina has a duty to investigate deaths
and cases of disappeared persons,42 whether they occur at the hands
of state agents,43 private persons,44 or persons unknown.45 An
investigation must be impartial, independent,46 and adequate “in the
sense that it must be capable of leading to a decision as to the cause
and circumstances of the death, as to whether any use of force was
justified under Article 2 and as to the ‘identification and punishment
of those responsible.’”47 Investigations must also be initiated
promptly and conducted with reasonable expedition.48 They must be
open to public scrutiny to ensure accountability and help maintain
public confidence.49 Finally, the “next of kin” must be involved “in
the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her
legitimate interests,”50 which include the right to effective remedies,
41

See Dayton Accords, supra note 5, Annex 4, art. 2(2).
See Cyprus v. Turkey 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 40.
43
See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1995).
44
See Menson v. United Kingdom 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 363.
45
See Togcu v. Turkey App. No. 27602/95, Eur.Ct . H.R. (2005); Kaya v Turkey,
No. 17747/03 Eur.Ct. H.R. (2006); Yasa v Turkey, 1998-VI Eur.Ct . H.R; 28
EHRR 408.
46
See Nachova v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006).
47
See DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & CARLA WARBRICK, Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights 50 (2009). See also Nachova v. Bulgaria,
2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.; 42 EHRR 933 para.113 GC.
48
Id. at 51.
49
See McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 34 EHRR 52.
50
See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 37 EHRR 52, para
109; Ogur v. Turkey, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R; 31 EHRR 912; Gulec v. Turkey,
1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R; 28 EHRR 121.
42
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such as monetary compensation,51 guaranteed by Article 13 of the
ECHR in cases involving death and disappearance.52
Article 2’s general obligations impose a costly,
overwhelming, and perhaps unrealistic burden on struggling
criminal justice institutions in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina affected by the criminal acts
committed during the war have a right, however, to expect that the
state will discharge its Article 2 obligations. At the same time, the
international community has created unrealistic expectations by
proclaiming, for example, that everyone who committed a war crime
will be prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to the maximum
extent possible under the law. Practically speaking, these high
expectations simply cannot be met. Not meeting them has the
potential for resulting in public disappointment that may
compromise the criminal justice system as a whole. The government
and international community must match expectations to Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s capabilities and build capacity to the extent resources
permit to better enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet its postconflict obligations. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound by the
ECHR, it must find ways to meet its obligations under the
Convention, including obligations with regard to war crimes
prosecutions, without promising too much or delivering too little.
In early 2008, the Special Department for War Crimes
developed a mission statement that made achieving the human rights
standards set out in the ECHR one of its main objectives. To
encourage compliance with the ECHR’s human rights standards, in
June 2009, the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes gave
Special Department prosecutors and staff members a memorandum
that spelled out what was expected of them in the 2009 professional
evaluation period. As a result, each prosecutor and staff member
knew what the mission of the Special Department was and knew that
meeting ECHR Article 2 and related human rights obligations was
expected. They also knew that success in meeting that goal would be
taken into consideration in their professional evaluations for the
year. For the first time, prosecutors and staff at the national level
would be graded on their human rights performance.53
51

See Kaya v. Turkey, supra note 45, para. 2108; Cobzaru v. Romania, App. no.
48254/99 para 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
52
See Őneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.; 41 EHRR 325 para 148 GC.
53
See David Schwendiman, Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Head, Special Department
for War Crimes to Prosecutors, Special Department for War Crimes: Expectations,
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The mission statement was also incorporated into the 2009
proposed Internal Rules for the Special Department for War Crimes.
The Special Department is required to have internal rules, which it
was supposed to develop shortly after its creation in 2004. However,
the Head of the Special Department did not prepare draft rules until
late 2008. In addition to the mission statement, the proposed Internal
Rules included draft policies and practice directions on charging,
immunity, plea-bargaining, case selection and prioritization, and
vulnerable victims, which were all aimed at giving those working in
the Special Department the tools they needed to meet their human
rights obligations under the ECHR. The draft rules also incorporated
recommended strategic staffing plans designed to ensure that the
Department would have the resources and assets needed to make
that possible.
In early 2009, the draft Internal Rules was circulated among
the prosecutors and staff in the Special Department for War Crimes
for review and comment. After drafting the rules and while they
were still out for comment, the Head of the Special Department
began using them to guide the Department’s work. The final version
of the draft rules was given to the Chief Prosecutor and the new
Head of the Special Department in December 2009.
B. Investigating War Deaths and the Fate of Disappeared
Persons

¶35

There were significant developments during 2009 in policies
and practices related to the investigation of war deaths and
disappeared persons. On January 1, 2009, the Special Department
for War Crimes assumed responsibility for managing the forensic
aspects of locating, recovering, examining, identifying, and
returning mortal remains from the war.54 The Special Department,
together with the Missing Persons Institute, the International
Commission on Mission Persons, the Cantonal and District
prosecutors, and the State Court, developed protocols and
Special Department for War Crimes Mission and Goals and Objectives for 2009
(June 4, 2009)(Also accessible at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as
Annex I).
54
The authority for the Special Department and the State Court to take on full
responsibility for the forensic work associated with the location, recovery,
examination and identification of human remains from the war derives from
articles. 103, 104, 105, 221, 222 of the Crimiminal Proocedure Code of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (as amended in 2003).
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procedures for streamlining the process for obtaining authorization
from the State Court for war crimes related excavations and
exhumations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cantonal and
District prosecutors remained responsible for ensuring that
fieldwork was completed primarily because the State Prosecutor’s
Office lacked the people and the appropriate resources for recovery
work. However, the Special Department closely monitored
fieldwork on graves sites.
The Special Department, principally the Head of the
Department supported by international and national staff, took full
responsibility for obtaining court orders for exhumation and
excavation, for inspecting and recommending improvements in the
mortuaries that received recovered remains, and for maintaining the
paper records of the completed fieldwork. The Special Department
also assumed responsibility for protecting and preserving the
forensic value of recovered remains and for ensuring that the
humanitarian purposes behind the recovery, identification, and
return of mortal remains from the war were complemented by the
proper investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those
criminally responsible for the deaths and disappearances, and made
it possible for survivors to make meaningful property claims for the
loss of a family member as a part of criminal proceedings.55
Under the Criminal Procedure Code, during criminal
proceedings, parties injured by criminal acts, including war crimes,
can file a “claim under property law” for, among other things,
“reimbursement of damages.”56 Prosecutors are obligated to notify
potential claimants of their right to file an injured party claim in
conjunction with pending criminal proceedings.57 In fact, during
case investigations, prosecutors must “gather evidence regarding
claims under property law relevant to the criminal offence.”58 The
prosecutor or court is also required “to question the suspect or the
accused in relation to the facts” relevant to injured party claims.59
55

See CRIM. PRO. CODE OF BOSN. AND HERZ., supra note 14, arts. 193–212.
Id. art. 195(2).
57
Id. art. 195(4).
58
Id. art. 196(1), i.e., “The Prosecutor has a duty to gather evidence regarding
claims under property law relevant to the criminal offense”; Id. art. 35(2)(g), i.e.,
“The Prosecutor shall have the following rights and duties . . . (g) to establish facts
necessary for deciding on claims under property law in accordance with Article
197 . . . .”
59
Id. art. 197(2).
56
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Proper integration of humanitarian and forensic intervention in the
recovery of human remains is essential to the proper discharge of
this responsibility.
In order to assist with the recovery and identification of
mortal remains, the Special Department for War Crimes began what
it called the Digital Archive Project in 2009 to recover and digitally
capture crime scene, excavation, exhumation, forensic examination,
and personal identification records held by various authorities
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without the Digital Archive
Project, these records of the deaths and disappearances of thousands
of victims of the war were in jeopardy of being lost through neglect.
With the assistance of the Human Rights Violators Unit of U.S.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, by the end of 2009 over
450,000 pages of documents were located, recovered, and scanned
into a searchable digital database and made available for use by the
Special Department, the Missing Persons Institute, and others. Until
they were included in the Digital Archive, many of the documents
had never been reviewed for purposes of criminal investigation or
prosecution because their existence was simply unknown to
prosecutors. The project helped secure the forensic, humanitarian,
and academic value of the records that were captured. Unless the
project continues, hundreds of thousands of valuable documents that
are not yet a part of the archive will be lost. Unfortunately, the
Prosecutor’s Office has not kept up the Digital Archives Project
since the end of 2009. The Special Department for War Crimes did
not assign staff to the project for 2010 even though the proposed
Internal Rules given to the new head of the Special Department
included strategic staffing plans for supporting the Digital Archive.
The head of the Special Department and the Chief Prosecutor
have not yet demonstrated that they have plans to build upon the
accomplishments of 2009 in locating, recovering, examining, and
identifying mortal remains from the war. The human rights
obligations that are implicated (e.g. the survivor’s right to an
investigation into the fate of persons murdered or disappeared, the
right to meaningful redress) in the failure to complete and maintain
the Digital Archive and to continue the work related to the recovery
of mortal remains are manifold and serious. The failure to complete
the Digital Archive will also impact prosecutor’s legal obligations
under the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the obligation
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to develop evidence that will allow parties injured by war crimes to
file civil claims. 60
In 2009, prosecutors and staff in the Special Department for
War Crimes’ Srebrenica team, worked to organize and coordinate
the work of the several agencies and institutions, such as the
Missing Persons Institute and the International Commission on
Missing Persons, who are responsible for excavation and
exhumation of graves in and around Srebrenica. As a result of this
work, over 3,000 survivors and family members of victims of the
Srebrenica killings were given notice of the their right to file injured
party property claims61 in conjunction with the prosecution of
Milorad Trbić.62 Injured parties made over 2,000 claims before the
close of the main trial. On October 16, 2009, a First Instance verdict
convicted Trbić of genocide and other crimes committed in
connection with events in and around Srebrenica and sentenced him
to thirty years in prison. As a result of the opportunity relatives of
victims of the Srebrenica killings had to file claims in Trbic, the
perception of and confidence in the Special Department and in the
State Court increased considerably among the Srebrenica survivor
and victim communities. The Special Department’s work in Trbić
also created the expectation that injured parties in other cases will
have similar opportunities to file property claims.63
The First Instance verdict rendered in Trbić will not be final
and binding until the appeals process is complete. The outcome of
the claims process in the Trbić case specifically, but also more
generally, is uncertain. There are still serious questions as to who
will pay the claims, where the money will come from, and how
much will actually be paid. However, it would have been impossible
for survivors to even file claims in Trbić without the work of the
Special Department in coordinating the efforts to identify the
remains of the Srebrenica victims. Unless each victim in a criminal
proceeding can be identified64 and brought into the courtroom as a
60

Id. arts. 193–212.
See id. arts. 192-212.
62
Trbić, supra note 3; Milorad TRBIĆ X-KR-07/386 Indictment 20.07.207
(Amended Indictment, Apr. 3, 2009).
63
See David Schwendiman, supra note 53.
64
For reasons of confidentiality, to protect the sensitivity of the information
regarding identification that was done by DNA analysis and comparison, and to
prevent public disclosure of the identities of the dead in cases where families or
survivors had not yet either been notified or had been notified but had refused to
accept identification, only those people who had previously been notified and
61
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name and not just a number, survivors will not be able to bring
injured party claims.
The accomplishments of the Srebrenica team in Trbić and
other cases stemming from the events in Srebrenica in identifying
remains were the foundation upon which Special Department built
its 2009 general policy regarding excavation and exhumation. In
fact, the efforts in Trbić paved the way for general policies that were
implemented and made part of the Special Department’s mission
statement. Also, the 2009 proposed Internal Rules, which were
given to the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes and the
Chief Prosecutor in December 2009, included a provision for the
creation of a Forensic Section within the Special Department to
continue work such as what was done in Srebrenica.65 The Head of
the Special Department and the Chief Prosecutor have yet to address
the serious questions of whether these policies will continue in the
future or whether the Special Department will adopt the proposed
Internal Rules. Failure to continue these policies will have serious
consequences in terms of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s human rights
obligations and public perception and confidence in the Special
Department.
C. Meaningful and Reasonably Quick Investigations,
Prosecution Decisions, and Prosecutions

¶43

As already noted, under Article 2 of the ECHR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina must make reasonable efforts to conduct impartial and
independent investigations into deaths and disappearances.66
Investigations are adequate if they establish the cause and
circumstance of death and whether any use of force was justified,
and if they result in sufficient information to permit the
accepted the identification of their loved ones were sent notice of their right to file
a claim. Great care was taken in building the databases used to manage the
identities of the dead and the notification of family members in connection with
the criminal proceedings against Trbić to ensure that all personal data collection,
management, and privacy requirements were met. No victim was identified by
name to the State Court whose relatives had not been notified and consented to the
inclusion of the name in the submissions made to the Court. An amended
indictment was filed at the close of the case identifying 3,737 victims by name.
See Milorad TRBIĆ (X-KR-07/386), Amended Indictment, 04.03.2009.
65
See Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz.,
Internal Rules (Proposed) Forensic Section (Dec. 9, 2009) (Also accessible at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex II).
66
See Nachova, supra note 46.
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“identification and punishment of those responsible.”67
Investigations must also be initiated promptly and conducted with
reasonable expedition.68 These obligations apply to war crimes
investigations and prosecutions at all levels, and place an
overwhelming and costly burden on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
What is “reasonable” in terms of these obligations is relative,
and, of course, influenced by the resources the state can use to
investigate and prosecute in such cases and the complexity of much
of what went on during the conflict that resulted in the violent
deaths of around 100,000 people.69 Bosnia and Herzegovina is
bound, nonetheless, to make genuine efforts to meet these
obligations, but it has had trouble doing so in the past.70 In 2008, it
was clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have even greater
trouble meeting its obligations in the future unless a more organized
way of managing the war crimes workload was developed.
In early 2009, the Special Department for War Crimes
implemented a new policy aimed at reforming war crimes case
selection and prioritization.71 The new policy adopted a
67

See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 47, at 50; See also Nachova, supra note 46.
Id. at 51.
69
Letter from Ewa Tabeau, Demographer, ICTY/OTP (Sept. 10, 2008); see also
BOSNIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD, supra note 6.
70
See, e.g., Husković, supra note 40 (a general discussion of the responsibilities
of prosecuting authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the relevant
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights insofar as the
investigation of matters related to people missing in the war and the rights of their
survivors are concerned).; see also, Advocacy Center TRIAL (ACT), supra note
40 (both submissions were filed in November 2009 on behalf of survivors of the
two men and both assert that the two are victims of violations of the procedural
aspects of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty and
security) in conjunction with Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights) and
Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR “due to the ongoing failure
of BiH authorities to conduct an ex officio, prompt, impartial, independent and
thorough investigation on [their] arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in
order to establish [their] fate and whereabouts, as well as to identify those
responsible for these crimes and to prosecute, judge and sanction them.”)
71
Beginning as early as late 2006, then Chief Prosecutor of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Marinko Jurčević, called for a comprehensive look at the conflict
from a criminal perspective, urging a more programmatic approach to selecting
cases for investigation and prosecution. Jurčević’s call eventually led to the work
of Dr. Marko Prelec, who was then the Head of the Research and Analysis Section
in the Special Department for War Crimes, in producing the comprehensive
survey of war crimes related situations and events. Chief Prosecutor Jurčević left
the position in February 2008 before he could see the results of his call.
68
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SITUATION-EVENT-ACT-ACTOR or “SEAA” approach, which
enabled the Special Department to better organize itself to meet
Article 2 investigation obligations. SEAA encourages prosecutors to
start investigations by looking broadly at situations that occurred
during the Bosnian War and then look more narrowly at the events
that took place within a situation to identify criminal acts and actors.
This approach helps prosecutors and managers better understand the
nature of the conflict from a criminal law perspective and make
more informed selections of matters to investigate and possibly
prosecute.72 Prior to implementing SEAA, prosecutors would focus
their investigative and prosecution efforts on individual complaint
files that had been generated since the beginning of the war.
Isolating their efforts in this fashion proved to be a wasteful and
ineffective way of dealing with the war crimes workload.
An essential tool necessary for the implementation of the
new case selection policy was a comprehensive survey of the
conflict, which was completed by Dr. Marko Prelec in 2008. The
survey was a thorough historical analysis of, among other things,
ICTY indictments, judgments, and available investigative files;
materials collected from military and other archives in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; investigative files held by the Prosecutors Office of
Bosnia and Herzegovina; information provided by witnesses and
informants during Special Department investigations; and
information provided by civil society, including information
provided by the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo.
This survey of materials resulted in a catalog of information
organized by where and when conduct that was most likely to have
violated international criminal and humanitarian law occurred
during the Bosnian War.73

72

See David Schwendiman, “Addressing the Nation’s War Crimes Predicament:
A Status Report – Special Department for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of
Bosnia and Herzegovina” at the 5th Conference of Chief Prosecutors of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Trebinje (October 1, 2009); see also Special Dep’t for War Crimes,
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz., Prosecution Guidelines, 5. Case
Selesction and Prioritization (February 9, 2009) (Also accessible at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex III).
73
DR. MARKO PRELEC, PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF BOSN. AND HERZ., A CRIMECENTERED APPROACH TO WAR CRIME CASE SELECTION IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA (June 2008).
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The survey made it possible for prosecutors to use neutral
criteria, which are written into Practice Direction No. 5,74 together
with a “Strategic Inventory”75 of existing criminal complaint files
and other files held by the State Prosecutor’s Office and some of the
Cantonal and District prosecutors to begin to plan and carry out
investigations and prosecutions. These investigations and
prosecutions enabled multiple people to be investigated and indicted
together and resulted in more significant, but fewer charges in each
indictment. As a result of the survey and inventory, investigations
had the potential to create a more complete and comprehensible
record of events, and prosecutions promised to save witnesses from
having to repeatedly give the same testimony. The survey began to
help eliminate unnecessary duplication of investigations, which was
wasting resources and costing the Special Department for War
Crimes credibility with witnesses, survivors, and investigators.
The survey, the criteria, and the inventory were improved
upon in 2008 and 2009 and were in use at the end of 2009.76 The
Norwegian government supported work on the comprehensive
survey and the Strategic Inventory, both of which are unique in
atrocity litigation. At the end of 2009 it was clear that more work
was required to capture all of the information that was needed to
74

Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 5. Case Selection and
Prioritization, supra note 72. Prosecutors in the Special Department for War
Crimes began using Practice Direction 5 to help them identify and select cases for
investigation and prosecution in early 2009.
75
The Strategic Inventory is an exercise carried out by analysts working in the
Research and Analysis Section of the Special Department for War Crimes. The
project is sponsored and supported by the Norwegian government. A database
created by Johnathan McCaskill, an International Legal Officer working in the
office of the Head of the Special Department for War Crimes, is used to manage
the results of the exercise. It was being populated through the end of 2009 with
information and data drawn by the analysts primarily from files held by
prosecutors in the Special Department that were received from the ICTY at the
end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. Well over 4000 such files were returned to
Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Rules of the Road Unit at the ICTY closed at
the end of 2004. The newly created Special Department for War Crimes in the
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina assumed the responsibility for
vetting future cases for possible investigation and prosecution.
76
An improved third version of the comprehensive survey of the conflict was
completed in December 2009. SPECIAL DEP’T FOR WAR CRIMES, SURVEY OF WAR
CRIME RELATED SITUATIONS AND EVENTS: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1992 TO
1995 (Version No. 3) (Dec. 4, 2009). Version No. 3 was translated and left with
the new Head of the Special Department for War Crimes and the Chief Prosecutor
in December 2009.
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make the Strategic Inventory fully useful and to establish a system
to maintain the inventory once the initial entries were completed. In
2009, the Norwegian government committed to help the
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue this work
through 2010.
The comprehensive survey and the inventory also helped the
Special Department assist a number of foreign prosecution and
investigation services, including the U.S. Department of Justice, the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Human Rights
Violators Unit, Norwegian prosecutors, and Danish prosecutors, in
conducting their own investigations to identify émigrés from Bosnia
and Herzegovina who may be responsible for war crimes committed
during the war. In early 2008, the Special Department initiated open
cooperation policies with foreign investigators and prosecutors
working on matters of common interest.77 The comprehensive
survey was used to help coordinate what foreign jurisdictions were
doing so that their investigations targeted people for deportations
and removal to Bosnia and Herzegovina who were of special interest
to the Special Department. Among other things, this kind of
collaboration helped prevent surprise deportations or removals to
Bosnia and Herzegovina that might have compromised the Special
Department’s control over its caseload. This mutually beneficial
arrangement gave the Special Department more control over what it
could anticipate while also giving considerable guidance to foreign
jurisdictions’ investigations. The policy promised to contribute
significantly to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to meet its Article
2 right to life obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights. These policies have not been continued into 2010.
Managing discretion in the investigation and charging of war
crimes was also the subject of Practice Direction No. 1, a policy
governing charging that was implemented in the Special Department
77

Special Department’s open cooperation policies did not extend to formal
cooperation on the same scale with Croatia or Serbia for a number of political
reasons and because of a fundamental lack of mutual trust in the region. The
reasons ranged from varying legal interpretations of state responsibilities under
the European Convention on Human Rights and obligations under European
conventions on extradition to differing understandings of each others’
responsibilities in terms of investigating and prosecuting war crimes under their
national law. On the working level, however, prosecutors in the Special
Department commonly cooperated and assisted their counterparts in Croatia and
Serbia and their counterparts in Croatia and Serbia assisted Special Department
prosecutors on occasion.
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in 2008 and used by Special Department prosecutors for most of
2009.78 The intent of the policy was, in part, to reduce the number of
counts charged in each war crimes case and to increase the number
of accused included in each prosecution. This was to be done while
also keeping in mind the right of victims to make property claims.
The goal of the policy was for cases to be managed more efficiently
by requiring less court time, fewer witnesses, and less evidence for
the courts to reconcile in reaching and writing their verdicts. The
policy also set standards for prosecutors to use when deciding
whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation and
propose an indictment. It defined and gave substance to vague terms
in the Criminal Procedure Code such as “grounds for suspicion”79
and “grounded suspicion,”80 which were susceptible to inconsistent
application. The intent of the policy was to give prosecutors greater
confidence in their ability to make well reasoned, more consistent,
and quicker prosecution decisions.
Practice Direction No. 1 also encouraged prosecutors to
consider terminating investigations when it was apparent, given the
standard that was written into the policy, that they would not result
in prosecutable cases. In the political environment in which war
crimes prosecutors must work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, choosing
to terminate an investigation can be one of the most difficult
decisions a prosecutor will ever have to make. The Special
Department established a review process to ensure that such
decisions were made based on the best available information and the
most well informed application of the law. In 2009, a number of
matters, including some high profile investigations, were terminated
short of prosecution after review by the Head of the Special
Department. These decisions saved valuable resources, which were
put to better use investigating and prosecuting more promising
matters.
The policy established in Practice Direction No. 1 results in
the use of less court time, fewer witnesses, and less evidence and
ensures that cases that are not viable will not be brought. It makes it
possible for the Special Department to do more with its limited
78

Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz.,
Prosecution Guidelines, 1. Charging (Jan. 13, 2009) (Also accessible at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex IV).
79
CRIM. CODE BOSN. & HERZ., supra note 14, art. 216(1) (the standard for
initiating an investigation).
80
Id. art. 226(1) (the standard for proposing an indictment).
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resources and time. Effective use of Practice Direction No. 1 will
enable the Special Department to better meet its obligations to
conduct expeditious investigations and prosecutions. Practice
Direction No. 1 was given to the Chief Prosecutor and the Head of
the Special Department in December 2009. Without this policy or
something very similar, it will be difficult for the Special
Department for War Crimes to manage its charging discretion in a
way that will help it meet its right to life obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights.
D. Pleas and Plea Bargaining
¶53

¶54

One of the most significant developments in 2008 and 2009
was the successful introduction at the national level of a practice of
encouraging pleas of guilty rather than going to trial. Beginning in
2008, in exchange for recommendations from the prosecution to the
court for limited sentences, accused were required to cooperate in
current or future investigations and prosecutions as well as make
verifiable proffers of information and evidence, particularly
information and evidence regarding the location of mortal remains.
The practice of plea-bargaining was pioneered in 2008 with
pleas from Dušan Fuštar81 and Paško Ljubičić.82 A number of
similar pleas were negotiated in 2009.83 In 2008, a policy was
developed and implemented to provide guidance, ensure
consistency, and limit prosecutors’ ability to negotiate with an
accused in order to properly manage the use of pleas. The policy
also set up a review process that ensured that the Special
Department maintained credibility with the defense and the court
and was consistent in the way it used pleas.84 Under the policy, the
Head of the Special Department for War Crimes reviewed and
signed off on all pleas before they were presented to the State Court
for acceptance. Before a prosecutor could even enter into plea
negotiations, the Head of the Department had to approve. An
important feature of the plea policy was that an agreement could not
recommend a sentence below the statutory minimum for the crime
81

Fuštar, supra note 3.
Ljubičić, supra note 3.
83
See, e.g., Ivanković, supra note 3.
84
Special Dep’t for War Crimes, Prosecutor’s Office of Bosn. and Herz.,
Prosecution Guidelines, 2. Pleas and Plea Bargaining (Jan. 11, 2008) (Also
accessible at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jihr/v8/n3/ as Annex V).
82
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to which the accused was charged without express authority from
the Head of the Special Department.
Pleas and plea-bargaining in war crimes cases in 2008 and
2009 were met with mixed reactions from the public.85 Plea deals in
war crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina are problematic
because of the gravity of the crimes involved, the affect on survivors
and victims, and because of the heightened political attention war
crimes cases attract in the region. However, they are legally
acceptable and, in most cases, practically desirable. The policy
implemented in 2008 to manage plea negotiations included features
that were intended to help reduce public criticism and preserve the
credibility and utility of the plea-bargaining. Among the most
important of these features was the requirement that prosecutors
meet with victims and survivors to explain a plea, answer why it was
reasonable under the circumstances, and explain why it should be
advanced.
The public reacted with hostility to the prosecution’s first
proposal regarding the sentence in the Damir Ivanković case that
was resolved in 2009. 86 Information Ivanković gave prosecutors as
part of plea negotiations resulted in the discovery and recovery of
the remains of approximately sixty men. The result was generally
well received by those who wanted to know what happened to the
men whose remains were found. At the same time, representatives
of some of the victims publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the
plea. Their concern was with the prosecution’s recommendation
regarding sentence and is attributable to the prosecutor’s failure to
adequately explain the plea and the fact that the original
recommended sentence was less than the statutory minimum
sentence for the offense with which the accused was charged. Even
after the recommended sentence was increased to a term greater than
the statutory minimum, the negative perception of the plea was
never fully overcome. Despite what prosecutors regarded as a
reasonably good outcome, the plea in Ivanković did not contribute to
the credibility of the Special Department or the legitimacy of pleabargaining as much as it might have if the plea bargaining policy
that was in force had been followed.
As the Ivanković case illustrates, the practice of pleabargaining is in its infancy in war crimes cases at the national level
85

See, e,g., Merima Husejnović, Victims dissatisfied with Bosnian Court’s
decisions, BIRN JUSTICE REPORT, May 30, 2008.
86
Ivanković, supra note 3.
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even if the practice becomes better
accepted, it is not likely to significantly reduce the number of cases
tried since most accused are unwilling to plead guilty and comply
with plea conditions such as providing information and evidence
regarding the crime, including information about the location of
mortal remains. In addition, the prosecutor must be willing to
consider a plea and be willing to inform the affected parties honestly
about the plea and give them an opportunity to voice their reactions
and concerns. Finally, the court must decide whether to accept the
plea as being in the best interests of the accused and the affected
public. Bringing all of this together will be difficult in most cases.
Presently, for a variety of reasons, including the social and
political pressure an accused is likely to feel from his constituent
people against admitting that he committed a war crime and lack of
experience with pleas on the defense side of the equation, pleas are
not routinely sought by accused or their counsel. When they do
propose a plea, accused and their counsel often ask for ridiculously
unreasonable terms such as sentences generally well below the
statutory minimum. It is also difficult sometimes for prosecutors in
war crimes cases to justify a plea deal if there is sufficient proof to
convict the accused at trial and if there is limited benefit beyond
saving the court and the prosecutor time and resources. Nonetheless,
plea-bargaining is a useful tool that saves valuable resources even in
war crimes cases. Plea-bargaining has significant value when an
accused is willing to admit responsibility and, as a condition of the
plea, make a profession of contrition to the victims and survivors of
his or her crimes. As happened in the Ivanković case, a plea can
result in the accused leading the prosecution to hitherto
undiscovered mortal remains, which can have considerable
humanitarian and forensic value. Also, an admission of guilt can
provide a somewhat more reliable and, perhaps more acceptable
factual record than a trial in which even well established facts are
often disputed for political reasons well after conviction.
As with many of the developments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 2008 and 2009, the policies implemented to manage
a prosecutor’s discretion in plea-bargaining, including the written
policies that were promulgated by the Head of the Special
Department in 2009, are at risk. If the new Head of the Special
Department or the Chief Prosecutor do not continue to enforce the
plea and plea bargaining policies that were implemented in 2008 and
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2009, the practice of plea-bargaining will quickly lose its legitimacy
and its utility.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
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The aim of the Atrocity Crimes Litigation Year-in-Review
(2009) Conference was to examine and analyze the development of
international criminal and humanitarian law in 2009. While this
article is not a comprehensive review of all of the significant
developments in war crimes prosecutions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 2008 or 2009, it does highlight some of the more
important developments and trends, particularly those developments
that have potential for affecting important policies and the progress
of international criminal and humanitarian law. The intent of this
article was not to condemn, but to describe, comment, and warn so
that the international community and those in control of the
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are responsible for
addressing the nation’s war crimes can more easily discharge their
human rights obligations and the duty they owe to the development
of international criminal and humanitarian law.
The international community is so knitted together when it
comes to international criminal and humanitarian law and practice
that what is being done in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be
ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. In less than four years, the State
Court has issued First Instance verdicts in over sixty cases and
almost forty of those cases have final and binding verdicts. Almost
all of them are translated and available for study, comment, and
criticism. Since most of the decisions—good or bad, right or
wrong—are likely to inform practice elsewhere, they require
scrutiny.
In the new adversary system introduced in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the prosecutor enjoys the responsibility for initiating
war crimes investigations and prosecuting worthy cases. The
prosecutor drives the system. This article introduces practices and
policies that were developed and introduced in 2007, 2008, and
2009 to help prosecutors and supervisors in the Special Department
meet the daunting task of managing their immense workload. These
policies systematized the use of prosecutorial discretion in order to
build credibility, lower opportunity costs, and ensure that the Special
Department complied with human rights standards.
War crimes work in Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a critical
juncture. Policies and practices that were effective in 2009 are in
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jeopardy of being abandoned. The international community’s urge to
declare an early victory when it comes to war crimes committed
during the Bosnian War is growing and encouraged by political
considerations that have little to do with the orderly development of
the tools needed to fix accountability for crimes committed during
the war. These include an understandable desire to end the oversight
of the High Representative and deliver more responsibility for
governance to national authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, the international community, of which Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a part, cannot afford to allow the rich legacy of the
ICTY and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s potential for adding to and
improving on that legacy to go to waste for lack of attention, vision,
or commitment.
The international community must take its share of the blame
for the situation in which Bosnia and Herzegovina now finds itself.
However, the national government and the heads of the State
Prosecutor and the State Court have a greater responsibility to
continue the policies and improvements that the international
community helped create within the Special Department for War
Crimes and in Section I of the Court. Those working in the Special
Department on War Crimes and the State Court must supply the
vision and support for what Bosnia and Herzegovina must do to
meet national and international expectations for war crimes
investigations and prosecutions stemming from the war that befell
the nation. The far ranging consequences of a failure to do this
properly are not acceptable.
The High Representative, the ICTY, and the international
community as a whole share with Bosnia and Herzegovina the
stewardship of international criminal and humanitarian law and the
legal legacy of the ICTY. They bear considerable responsibility for
ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina meets those expectations and
properly discharges that stewardship in the process. Bosnia and
Herzegovina must accept international involvement in war crimes
investigations and prosecutions to the extent it is necessary to
guarantee this happens. Finally, scholars must do their part to supply
both the attention and the vision that can help guide those in Bosnia
and Herzegovina who genuinely understand their roles and the
significance of what they are doing and who are committed to
making good on the potential that exists for turning the nightmare of
the war into a legal legacy that can be the envy of the world.

